A turnpike theorem is proved for a general equilibrium model with finitely many immortal consumers.
Introduction
This paper indicates one way to link equilibrium theory with capital theory and especially with turnpike theory. I consider a model with finitely many, infinitely lived consumers. Their utility functions are additively separable with respect to time and they discount future utility. There are finitely many, infinitely lived firms. Primary resources are necessary for production and their supply is constant over time. Technology and utility functions do not change over time either. The model is simply an ordinary general equilibrium model with infinitely many commodities. The infinity arises because the horizon is infinite and commodities are distinguished according to date.
I use results from a previous paper of my own (1972) in order to prove that the model has an equilibrium. I also prove that the initial resources may be chosen so that there exists a stationary equilibrium. I prove the following analogue of Scheinkman's turnpike theorem (1976) . Suppose that all consumers discount future utility at the same rate. Then, the equilibrium allocation converges provided this discount rate is sufficiently small.
Finally, I prove that if consumers do not all have equal rates of time preference, then the less patient consumers eventually consume nothing in equilibrium. The less patient consumers are those whose rates of time preference exceed the smallest rate among all consumers. In an equilibrium, the less patient mortgage all their future income beyond a certain date in order to consume more, earlier.
It is easy to relate the above results to capital theory. In capital theory,function is defined directly on a single intertemporal production possibility set. The following is typical of the maximization problems studied in capital theory:
f ' 6'u(k,,k,+,)l(k,,k,+,) ED for all t, t=o (1.1)
where It, is given. In this problem, t is the index for time, 6 is the discount factor applied to future utility where 0~6 < 1, k, is the vector of capital stocks at time t, u is the utility function, and D is the intertemporal production possibility set. If one makes appropriate assumptions, it is not hard to prove that (1.1) has a solution.
A solution corresponds to an equilibrium in my model. Sutherland (1970) and Peleg and Ryder (1974) optimum, provided that 6 is sufficiently close to one. There are subtle differences between capital theory and the theory I develop. In the first place, equilibria are not necessarily unique, whereas the optima of capital theory normally are unique. Also, the turnpike theorem of capital theory asserts that optimum paths converge to a stationary optimum which is independent of the initial conditions. In my case, the limit of an equilibrium is not necessarily a stationary equilibrium and the limit depends on the initial conditions. The initial conditions affect the limit of an equilibrium because they affect the relative wealths of the consumers. Also, because conditions change over time, some consumers may borrow or lend early in time. For this reason, they may be paying or earning interest when in the asymptotic state approached as the equilibrium converges. Thus, the limit is strictly speaking not a stationary equilibrium, but a stationary equilibrium with transfer payments. It is easy to see why the turnpike theorem applies to equilibrium.
I assume that all utility functions are concave. Hence, equilibrium maximizes a weighted sum of consumers' utility functions, the weights being the inverses of the marginal utilities of expenditure.
Since I assume that all consumers discount future utility at the same rate, the maximand may be written as
In this expression, i is the index for consumers, /li is the marginal utility of expenditure for consumer i, ui is his utility function, and xi is his consumption vector at time t. 6 is the discount factor applied to future utility.
(1.2) looks much like the objective function in (1.1). Hence, a version of Scheinkman's theorem should imply that equilibrium converges. In fact, I do not apply Scheinkman's theorem or any of the recent generalizations of it. Instead, I provide a direct proof of the convergence result. I do so for three reasons: (1) I do not want to make unnecessary assumptions;
(2) I obtain exponential convergence, which is stronger than that of corresponding theorems in the literature; and (3) my method of proof seems to improve on existing methods.
My proof is in many ways simply a modification of existing proofs. I use the value loss method. My main innovation is to use a one-sided value loss rather than a two-sided value loss. This value loss is easy to interpret and leads to many simplifications.
Nevertheless, my proof is very long and complicated. The complications arise largely because I use a full general equilibrium model rather than the reduced form, aggregate model of capital theory.
If one assumes that there are one consumer and one firm, then my turnpike theorem becomes a turnpike theorem in the sense of capital theory and can be compared with theorems in the literature. In this case, my result is neither more general nor more special than existing ones. I elaborate in section 6.
I emphasize that my goal is only to link two distinct branches of economic theory. I do not claim that my model is realistic or that it justifies capital theory. The assumption of immortality is certainly not realistic. Also, prices in my model can be interpreted only as Arrow-Debreu prices of contracts for future delivery. Such prices seem especially unrealistic when there is an infinite horizon.
I emphasize that I cannot avoid interpreting prices as prices for forward contracts. I cannot interpret prices as spot prices and say that agents have perfect foresight. This last point of view is the one sometimes taken in capital theory. In my model, consumers may borrow and lend, which means that there must be forward markets. In capital theory, there is only one consumer, and he owns the firm or firms. Hence, it is impossible for the consumer to borrow or lend.
By linking equilibrium theory and capital theory, I do give some insight into the nature of the assumptions that must be made in order to obtain the turnpike property. Dealing with a general equilibrium model obliges one to state assumptions only in terms of individual utility functions, endowments and production possibility sets. Assumptions in capital theory do not always have a concrete interpretation, since the models are aggregated. I make strong assumptions.
I assume that utility functions are strictly concave and that production possibility sets are strictly convex. The assumption about production possibility sets is especially strong, for it excludes constant returns to scale. However, if one allows constant returns to scale, then there can exist optimal programs which oscillate forever, even if future utility is not discounted. Therefore, the turnpike theorem is not valid if one insists on convergence to a point. In order to exploit strict convexity, I must assure that price ratios exactly equal marginal rates of transformation in production. (The prices referred to are for the limit stationary equilibrium with transfer payments.) I assure equality by assuming that firms can use inputs and produce outputs efficiently in any ratios they like. This assumption excludes the fixed coefficients, linear production model. Infinite-dimensional vectors are always written in bold face.
Consumers
There are I consumers, where I is a positive integer. The utility function of consumer i for consumption in one period is ui: RL,f+ (-co, 00) . Utility is additively separable with respect to time and consumer i discounts future utility by a factor ai, where O-C di< 1. That is, if consumer i consumes the bundle x, E Rfp in period t, for t =O, 1,2,. . ., then his total utility from the point of view of period zero is ctm,0 6fui(xf).
The endowment of each consumer in each period is ORE R?. Notice that each consumer is endowed only with primary goods. This assumption is not necessary. It is made only for convenience.
Firms
There are J firms, where J is a positive integer. A firm transforms inputs y, E RL in one period into outputs y, E R ",p in the succeeding period. Inputs carry a negative sign and outputs a positive sign. The production possibility setoflirmjis YjcRLxRp. y = (y,, y,) denotes a typical vector in Yj, where y,~Rk and y,~Ry.
Firms have an endowment of producible goods, available at time zero. These goods should be thought of as having been produced from inputs in period -1. 
The economy
The economy is described by the list d = {(ui, di, q), (I$, y,; '), tiij: i = 1, . . ., I and 1,. . ., J}.
Allocations
A consumption program for a particular consumer is of the form x=(x0,x1,...), where X'ER 4 for all t, and sup,,,x: < co. x' is the consumption vector at time t. A consumption program is said to be stationary if x2=x0 for all t.
A production program is of the form y =(y', y', . . .), where y'=(yb, ~1:) ER?xRL+" for all t 2 0, and sup,,,yi < co. The program is feasible for firm j if y' E I; for all t 2 0. A production program is said to be stationary if yf = y" for all t.
An allocation for the economy is of the form ((xi),(yj)), where each q=(x;,x!,...) is a consumption program and each yj=($, yi, . , .) is a production program feasible for firm j. The allocation ((xi), (yj)) is feasible if ~XfS~Ui+~(J$o+y:,') for all t?O.
Notice that the feasibility of an allocation depends on the endowments y,;' of the firms. Also, the definition of feasibility implies free disposability.
((xi), (yj)) is said to be stationary if each of the programs xi and yj are stationary, and if in addition y>l = y,;' for all t.
The vector ((+),(JJ~)) should not be confused with ((xf), (yi)), which is the vector of allocations at time t.
Pareto optima&y
A feasible allocation ((Xi), (_Vj)) is said to be Pareto optimal if there exists no feasible allocation ((-CJ,gj)) such that 2 6:Ui(~) ~ ,~~ 6:Ui(X:) for all i, t=o with strict inequality for some i.
Prices
A price system is simply a non-zero vector p of the form (p', pl 
Utility maximization
Given the price system p, consumer i's budget set is pi(p) = n 1 x is a consumption program, and i
.
He solves the problem
&(p) denotes the set of solutions to this problem.
Equilibrium
An equilibrium consists of ( (xi) The convergence is said to exponential if there is a such that
< a < 1 and' [[((xi), (Y;)) -((xi), (yj)) II< a',
for all sufficiently large t. (3.11)
Marginal utilities of expenditure
Necessity of primary inputs. The following is true, for all j:
Let y=(y,,yJ~
If Y, >O and y,,=O, for all k E L,, then g,(y) > 0.
(3.12)
Adequacy
The final assumptions guarantee that no consumer would have a zero income in equilibrium.
For each i, co,>0
for some kEL, nL, . (3.13) That is, every consumer is endowed with some primary good, such as labor, which is also a consumption good.
i o,>O for all MEL,.
i-l (3.14)
That is, there is a positive endowment of every primary good.
There are 0 E Ry and (yjO,yjl)~ 5 for j= l,.. .,J,
That is, it is possible to produce some of every good in every period while using only primary inputs from outside the production system.
Theorems
I assume that assumptions (3.1H3.15) apply.
Theorem. Suppose that Es= 1 y,: >O for all k E L,.
Then there exists an equilbrium. 
Theorem.
Any equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal.
Theorem. Let ((xi),Cyj),p) be a competitive equilibrium. If n is such that 6, <maxi di, then xk =0 for t sufficiently large.
For the turnpike theorem, I need the following assumption:
Interiority assumption.
There exists [>O and 4 such that O<Lj < 1 and the following are true. If di= 6 for all i, where 4 <fi < 1 and if ((Xi),Cyj),P) is a stationary equilibrium with transfer payments, then It is, no doubt, possible to do so, but I have not found a convincing set of assumptions which do not lead to an excessively complicated proof. Assumption (3.7) is especially awkward. It makes it impossible to represent the use of capital equipment in production. The conventional representation is as follows. One labels equipment according to age. A production process using a machine transforms the machine and other inputs into an older machine and other outputs. The process transforms one younger machine into one older machine. A fixed coefficient of one is unavoidable.
Relation to the literature
This paper links Arrow-Debreu equilibrium theory with capital theory. The equilibrium theory I use is that for an economy with infinitely many commodities.
The extension of equilibrium theory to such economies was made by Debreu (1954) , Peleg and Yaari (1970 ), myself (1972 ) and. Stigum (1972 ,1973 . Debreu proved that equilibria in such economies are Pareto optimal and that Pareto optima may be realized as equilibria with transfer payments. Peleg and Yaari, Stigum and I proved that equilibria exist.
Capital theory has a long history. McKenzie (1979) has written an excellent up to date survey of turnpike theory.
IMathE D
The turnpike theory existing in the literature, deals with models which have only one utility function and one production possibility set. I simply introduce many firms, many consumers and budget constraints for consumers. The turnpike theorem I prove is an analogue of that of Scheinkman (1976, theorem 3, p. 28) .
In my proof, I use a variation of the value loss method. I believe that this method traces back to the work of Radner (1961) . It has since been improved by Atsumi (1965) , Brock (1970) , McKenzie (1974 McKenzie ( ,1976 , Cass and Shell (1976) , Rockafellar (1976) , Brock and Scheinkman (1976), and Magi11 (1977) .
The most recent turnpike theorem of the type I prove is contained in McKenzie (1979, theorem 10') . His proof builds on that of Scheinkman and uses methods developed in the list of papers just cited.
It is hard to compare McKenzie's theorem with my own, since our models are so different. In order to clarify the connection between his work and my own, I show how to derive from my model the reduced form used by McKenzie. This reduced form model is the one typically used in turnpike theory.
Suppose that in my model there are one consumer and one firm. The utility function of the consumer is u: RL,E-'( -co, co). His initial endowment is o. The production possibility set of the firm is Y c Rk x R!y. Let
Let u: D+(-co, co) be defined by
McKenzie's economy is defined by D and v.
The key concavity assumption of McKenzie is stated in terms of the concavity of V. But the concavity of v depends on the properties of both u and Y in a complicated way. Some of the long arguments in my proof of the turnpike theorem may be interpreted as proving that u is concave. Benhabib and Nishimura (1981, section 3.3, remark a) have already pointed out that the concavity of u requires very strong assumptions about underlying production relations. They work with a continuous time model.
I now return to the comparison of McKenzie's theorem with my own. My theorem is more general in that I prove exponential convergence and he does not. McKenzie's theorem is more general than mine in that he makes only a local strict concavity assumption. I assume strict concavity or convexity everywhere. McKenzie's assumption is that the Hessian of v is negative ---- Remark. Yano (1980) has generalized the turnpike theorem of this paper. He assumed constant returns to scale while assuming that the von Neumann facet containing the golden rule input-output vector is a single ray.
I now turn to my result that there exists a stationary equilibrium [theorem (4.2)]. When there is only one firm and one consumer, stationary equilibrium becomes what is known as the modified golden rule. Therefore, the proof of theorem (4.2) provides a way to prove the existence of a modified golden rule. Brock has already pointed out that the modified golden rule is a competitive equilibrium with distortions, in section 2.3 of this paper of 1973 . Sutherland (1970 and Peleg and Ryder (1974) proved that a modified golden rule exists. They used fixed point arguments. I do so as well, but my argument is simply a modification of the usual argument which proves that a general equilibrium model has an equilibrium. Thus, I clarify the tie between general equilibrium theory and the work of Sutherland, Peleg and Ryder. My proof is a variation of one given in a previous paper (1979) of my own. In that paper, there is uncertainty and there is no discounting of future utility.
The idea expressed by my theorem (4.4) has already appeared in the literature. This theorem asserts that less patient consumers eventually consume nothing. Ramsey (1928, pp. 558-559) pointed out that in long-run or stationary equilibrium, those consumers with the highest rate of time preference would live at a subsistence level. Rader (1971, chapter I) makes an argument similar to my own. A related idea appears in the last section of one of his recent paper [Rader (1979) ]. Finally, Becker (1980) proved an assertion similar to Ramsey's Becker studies capital theory using a disaggregated model, just as I do. He proves the existence of an equilibrium [Becker (1978, chapter 4) ] and the existence of a stationary equilibrium [Becker (1980) ]. Becker's work differs from mine in that his model is one of temporary equilibrium, not of general equilibrium. Consumers can sell or accumulate capital but they cannot borrow.
Some lemmas
The boundedness of feasible allocations is expressed by the following two lemmas. The proofs of these lemmas are completely routine and are not given. They make use of the facts that production is impossible without primary goods and that production sets are closed and convex. In proving theorem (4.1), it is easier to deal with an economy in which production possibility sets are cones. For this reason, I now modify the economy in order to obtain an equivalent economy 6* in which all production possibility sets are cones. E* will also be such that free disposability is incorporated in the production process rather than in the definition of feasibility.
I introduce one new factor of production for each firm. Thejth such factor can be used only by firm j. This factor may be thought of as the entrepreneurial factor. McKenzie (1959) has suggested introducing such a factor in just the way I do. 
j=l
Notice that I have introduced one unit of factor j into the economy, for each j. The consumption set of every consumer is still Ry and the utility function of consumer i is still ui: R!p( -co, 00).
Finally, I introduce an extra firm, firm J+ 1, which disposes of goods. The production possibility set of firm J+ 1 is Y~*,,=R~xR~x{O}~R=+~XR=P.
Let ei,J+l--Z-l, for all i. The initial endowment of firm J + 1 is y;:r, 1 = 0. In summary, the economy &* is {(Ui,~i,OT), (Yjl', Yj*),8ij: i=l,...,Z, j=1,...,5+1}.
An equilibrium for E* is defined in the obvious way. It is easy to see the following.
Lemma. There is a one to one correspondence between equilibria for d and for B*. An equilibrium for d ** is defined in the obvious way. It should be clear that an equilibrium for &'** may be interpreted as an equilibrium for 6*. Hence by lemma (7.3), it is sufficient to prove that &** has an equilibrium. That &** has an equilibrium follows from theorems 1 and 3 of my previous paper (1972) . Some routine arguments are needed to prove that &** satisfies the assumptions of that paper. In order to save space, these arguments are not given here [they do appear in my paper of (1980)]. Q.E.D.
Proof of theorem (4.2)
I prove the existence of what I call a b-equilibrium for a two-period economy, b", where 6 is the discount factor applied to future utility. It will be easy to see that a a-equilibrium for b" corresponds to a stationary equilibrium for 6. In B", consumption takes place in the first period. Firms j=l , . . ., J use inputs in the first period in order to produce outputs in the second period. An artificial firm, firm zero, transfers goods from the second period back to the first. Firms j, for j = 1,. . ., J, are subject to a sales tax of l-6 times the value of their output. This tax is paid to consumers according to the shares eij. Firm zero pays no tax. The tax embodies the distortion caused by discounting future utility.
I now define b" precisely. The commodity space of 6' is RL x RLp. The production set of firm zero is The production set of firm j, for j = 1,. . ., J, is simply q. The consumption set of each consumer is The utility function of consumer i is Uo(X, 0) = Ui(X). q:(p) denotes the set of solutions of this problem. Notice that for jl 1, firm j maximizes his after tax profits, the tax being (1-6)~~ . y,. If j? 1, the tax paid by firm j to consumer i is 8iJ{1 -6)p, . y,, where (y,,y,)~ylj0(p). Hence, the income of consumer i, given PEA, is wi(P)=PO'wi+ i ei&O'YjO+P1'YjlX j=O where (yjo, yjl) E qy(pl) for j = 0, 1, . . ., J. w,(p) is well-defined po. yjo + pl . yjl is independent of (yjo, yjl) E q:(p) for j = 1,. . ., J. The maximization problem of consumer i, given PEA, is max (up(x') 1 x0 E X and p. x0 2 w,(p)>.
His initial endowment is
provided that <y(p) denotes the set of solutions to this problem, for i = 1,. 
Proof of theorem (4.3)
I do not give a detailed proof of this theorem, since the proof is completely routine.
One approach is as follows. 
Proof of theorem (4.4)
Let ((xi), tyj),p) be an equilibrium and let ni>O be the marginal utility of expenditure for consumer i in the equilibrium. Suppose that p is so normalized that Ci/li= 1. Let B be as in lemma (7.1). Then, Ixf 1 IR for all i and t. By assumptions Let T be such that b<Ai(6ip'6)Ta. Then if t 2 7: it must be that x:=0. Q.E.D.
Proof of theorem (4.5)
Let ((ai),vj),a) be a competitive equilibrium for &. I first define the allocation to which ((ii), ($j)) converges. For each i, let Ai> be the marginal utility of expenditure for consumer i in the equilibrium ((~i),~j),~). This marginal utility was defined in section 2. I assume that fi is so normalized that xi Ai= 1. Let U: Ry+(-co, co) be defined by
for all i, and 1 Xi =x .
I I
Let 8' be the economy obtained from & by replacing all the consumers with a single consumer whose utility function is U and whose initial endowment is o =ci wi. By a slight modification of theorem (4.2), 6' has a stationary equilibrium (X,(jj),p). I will assume that @ is so normalized tha the marginal utility of expenditure of the single consumer is one. Let (Xi) be such that
X=x Xi and U(X3=C ni-'u(Xi).
It is easy to see that ((XJ,(jJ,j) is a stationary equilibrium for & with transfer payments. In this equilibrium, the marginal utility of expenditure for each consumer i is Ai. ((Xi),~j)) is the stationary allocation to which ((ai),Gj)) converges. The proof that ((ii), ~j)) converges to ((Xi), OTj)) uses the fact that these allocations solve related maximization problems. The set of feasible allocations for d depends on the initial holdings, Cjyi,', of produced goods in the economy. Think of these initial stocks as a variable. This variable is denoted by K, where K E RL +". For each value of K, let R(K) be the set of feasible allocations ((xi),bj)) for & such that
The relevant maximization problem is the following: max 2 S'c Ai-'Ui(X:) 1 ((Xi), olj)) E F(K) .
f=O i
The stationary allocation ((Xi,~j)) solves this problem with initial resources R (12.1) =cjyjl. The allocation ((ii), vj)) so ves 1 this problem with initial resources R" =cjyJ<'. These assertions may be proved as follows. Because ((Xi),wj),A and ((ai),(Jj),i) are both equilibria with marginal utilities of expenditure A Ir.. ., A,, they solve the first-order conditions for solutions of (12.1). Because the constraints are convex and the objective function is concave, any solution of the first-order conditions is an optimum.
Problem (12.1) is a variant of the maximization problem traditional in growth theory. I now simply adapt the well-known proofs of the turnpike theorem to the situation here. 
.). Let F,(K)=@*(K--@-T/,(K).
F, is the Liapunov function I will use. The diagram presented in fig. 1 may help one visualize F,.
I now turn to a few technical matters. A series of lemmas then follow which establish properties of F,. The actual proof of convergence is contained in the last few paragraphs. By the definition of ni, G'aUi(x:)/aX,~nip:, with equality if xf,>O for all i, k and t. Since ci/li= 1, there is i such that /lizl-r.
At the end of the proof of theorem (4.1), I noted that the income of every consumer is positive in equilibrium. Therefore, xik > 0 for some t and k, so that b 2 aui(x;)/ax, = A,6 -'pi 2 I '6 -'pi.
That is, 6-'pf,i bl. It now follows that for the same value of t and for any n = 1,. . ., I, a 5 au,(xf,)/ax, 5 A,6 -'pf, 5 A,bz.
In conclusion, A, zab-'1-l.
Q.E.D. By the definition of an equilibrium, it is enough to prove that ~'$0 for all t. By the monotonicity of preferences [assumption (3. 3)] all consumption goods have positive price. Define a good to be productive if either it is a consumption good or may be used directly or indirectly to produce consumption goods. Assumptions (3.7) and (3.8) imply that this definition makes sense. Since all consumption goods have positive price, all productive goods have positive price. The interiority assumption implies that all goods are productive. This proves (12.3).
I now prove the following:
There exist numbers q and 4; such that 0 < q 5 P;, s tj for all k, if 6 2 4 where &-is as in the interiorityassumption.
( 12.4) If (12.4) were not true, then a compactness argument would imply that there is a stationary equilibrium with some price equal to zero, which is impossible by (12.3) . The compactness argument makes use of lemma (7.2), which asserts that stationary allocations are uniformly bounded.
I now turn to the properties of the Liapunov function Fs. The next lemma says that fig. 1 is correct. It says that @is a subgradient of I/ at R.
Lemma.

Zf F,(K) is well-defined, then F,(K) 2 0 = F,(R).
(12.5)
Proof
It is obvious that F&)=0.
Let ((xi), (yj)) EP(K). I must show that (12.6)
Choose (yj') arbitrarily so that cjy,;' = K. In order to see that the equation below is true, cancel terms and use the fact that (12.7)
It is convenient to write the right-hand side of the above as S, +SZ +S,, where Si is the ith infinite sum. In what follows, 1.1 will denote the maximum norm. That is, if u is a vector, then (u) =maxk 1~~1. This lemma follows in a routine way from the previous one and from the differential concavity of utility functions and production possibility sets [assumptions (3.4) and (3.10)] and from the boundedness of feasible stationary allocations [lemma (7.2)].
Lemmas (12.5) and (12.10) imply the following:
(12.11)
Hence, in order to demonstrate that ((ai),( converges to ((Xi),~j)) exponentially, it is sufficient to prove that Fa(If') converges to zero exponentially.
The next lemma is simply a corollary of the previous one: Clearly, ((q),cvj>) is an allocation. One may prove that it is feasible by imitating the argument used by Gale.
Observe that lim f+O x: = Xi exponentially. Since Ui is differentiable, it follows that there is c > 0 such that *~~(ui(xf)-s(x,))~ -C for all i.
Let I be as in lemma (12.2). Then, W0)2 5 s'~A;l(ui(x:)-ui(xi))~ -IA-'c.
f=O i
Hence,
where 4 is as in (12.4) and B is as in lemma (7.2). Q.E.D.
The proof of the next lemma is the most difficult step in the proof of the theorem:
Lemma.
There I start by defining a feasible allocation (('Xi), ("Yj)) which converges to ((%J,(Y;-)) exponentially and from below. I do so by using the construction of Gale, which I have already used in proving lemma (12.13). Clearly, $Czi~i;CWi+~~~jo+Cyjl.
This is simply (12.14), with c(=& Yjo=$jo, and YJ;' =Yj,. Let Then, (('xi), ("Yj)) is a feasible allocation. I now modify ((OXJ,(OYj)) SO as to obtain an allocation (('xi),(rYj)) such that g,('yi) = 0 for all j and t. For all j and t, let ('Y& 'Y;l) = ("Y;,,, a:OY:.l) where u; = max {a 2 11 ("yi,, a'y:,) E y}.
This defines (('xi), ('yj)). Since 'yil 2 "yil for all j and t, (('xi), (ly,)) is feasible.
The E of (12.16) is defined by the formula &=(1+4 [-rB)-'D-', (12.17) where B is a bound on stationary allocations [which exists by lemma (7.
2)], where [ >0 is as in the interiority assumption, and where D is a constant defined just after (12.18) below. It will be seen that D could be defined before E, so that the argument is not circular. D> 1, and I assume that B> 1 and i < 1, so that E < c/4.
I next show that the part of (('xi),('yj)) from some time t on is feasible, provided that the vector of initial capital stocks, K, satisfies (IK -RI <E.
Suppose that 0 < 1 K -RI = E and let T be the largest non-negative integer such that $T+2KkzlK -KI for all k.
Such a T exists since E < c/4 and K,z [ for all k. I claim that the part of
Therefore, from T on belongs to 9(K). For all keL,.
Kk&-IK-Kl~(1-$T+2)Kk.
=(l-$Tf2)Kk5Kk for all keL,,.
This proves the claim.
Let (("Xi),("yj)) be defined by (('x~),("~~))=((~x~'~),(~$+~)). I have shown that ((2Xi), ("Yj)) belongs to F(K), that it converges exponentially to ((xi), (yj)) and that it satisfies g,("y:) =0 for all t and j. I need an additional condition, which is that the feasibility condition be satisfied with equality in every period. I define surplus vectors Z'E R$ as follows: z'=K+&u-C"x"-i (i and I next define a process which I call distributing surpluses. This process will transform the given allocation into one which has no surpluses and still satisfies the conditions listed below. Suppose that we start with an allocation ((xi),oJj)) which has the property that a positive quantity of every good is either consumed or used directly or indirectly to produce some consumption good. By the interiority assumption, the stationary allocation ((xJ, gj)) has this property, and it follows that ((2~J, ('Yj)) does so as well. I show how to distribute the surplus vector ZE RL, available at time t. I describe how to distribute the first component of z.
Each of the other components are distributed in succession in the same manner. The distribution of the first component results in a new allocation (&),cV;) which is defined as follows. If the first good is consumed by some consumer, say by consumer i, then let *1 =xfi + z1 and let all other components of the allocation ((A?~),($~)) be the same as the corresponding components of ((Xi),(yj)). If the first good is not consumed by anyone, then there exists a sequence of the form k, j, k, ,. . .,j, k,i, where k,= 1, and with the following interpretation.
In the allocation ((Xi),(yj)), firm j, uses good k, to produce good k,, 1, for n = 0, 1, . . ., N -1, and a positive quantity of good k, is consumed by consumer i. Clearly, the sequence may be chosen so that N<L.
For n=O,l,..., N, let e, be the k,th standard basis vector of Rt. Define a,, a,, . . ., uN as follows. Let a, =zr. Given a,_ 1, let u,=max(u2O((yb+"-'--ua,_,e,_,, y~:n-l+ue,)~ qj for j =j,_r.
By assumptions (3.7)-(3.9), a, is well-defined and a, >O if a,_ r >O. if n=O 1 , ,..., N-1, let ~+n=(y:.o+n-unen,yf,:"+u,+,e,+,) for j=j,.
Let &= xi + aNeN. Let all the other components of the allocation ((x"J,(yj)) be the same as the corresponding components of ((xJ,(~j)).
The allocation ((3xi),(3yj)) is defined to be an allocation obtained from (('xi),('yj)) by distributing the surpluses z' for t=O, 1,. . . . It should be clear that the new allocation belongs to F(K) and that gj("y;)=O for all j and t. I now show that ((3xi), ("yj)) converges exponentially to ((Xi), gj)). First of all, let a,,~,, . . ., uN be as in the construction just described. If the starting allocation ((xi), (yj)) equalled the stationary allocation ((pi), (_Vj)), then it would follow from profit maximization and from inequality (12.4) that If one takes into account the fact that a component of (('xi), ("yj)) may be affected by at most L2 distributed surpluses, one obtains that
if the allocation to which surpluses are distributed is always at most distance 2 from ((xi), bj)). In summary, I now may prove that lim,,, F,(K') =0 exponentially. By (12.11) this proof will complete the proof of the theorem.
Choose a small positive number no larger than the E of lemma (12.12) and the E of lemma (12.15). Call this number E again. Let LX be as in lemma (12.12) and let A be as in lemma (12.15). Clearly, I may assume that c1< A. Finally, let C be as in lemma (12.13). Then, I know that Fa(Z?')s C.
If 1~824 and I~'-RI~s, then Let T be the smallest positive integer such that As2 2 C-aE2T. This completes the proof of assertion (12.26 
